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ABSTRACT 
 
EFFECTS OF SELF-ESTEEM ON SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS 
 
ELİF KARUL 
 
M.Sc. Thesis, August 2019 
 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Murat Kaya 
 
Keywords: self-esteem, supply chain contracts, decision making 
 
We study the effects of self-esteem on supply chain decisions and profits. To this end, the 
data obtained in computerized decision-making experiments in which human subjects 
participated as manufacturers (who offer a contract) and retailers (who either reject the 
contract, or accept and set the order quantity from the manufacturer) that engage in a long 
run relationship is used. Rosenberg scale survey data is used to categorize the 
manufacturers and retailers into high and low self-esteem classes. We find low self-
esteem manufacturers to offer more attractive contracts to retailers, obtain lower profits 
themselves and cause higher supply chain total profit. Contrary to our expectations, we 
find high self-esteem retailers to end up accepting less favorable contracts compared to 
low self-esteem retailers, though the difference is not statistically significant. We explain 
this phenomena with the overordering tendency of the high self-esteem retailers: They 
overorder more frequently, and make larger overorders. We observe manufacturers to 
increase the attractiveness of their contract offer in the next period following a rejection. 
Finally, we develop a regression model to explain retailer order quantity decisions based 
on the retailer self-esteem score, lost demand in the previous period, number of contract 
rejections in the relationship, and the optimal order quantity. Our results indicate the 
importance of self-esteem as a significant factor in supply chain decisions and firms’ 
profit performance.  
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ÖZET 
 
ÖZSAYGININ TEDARİK ZİNCİRİ KARARLARINA ETKİSİ 
 
ELİF KARUL 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ağustos 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Murat Kaya 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: özsaygı, tedarik zinciri kontratları, karar verme 
 
Bu çalışmada, bir kişilik özelliği olan özsaygı’nın tedarik zinciri kararlarına ve firmaların 
kârlarına olan etkisini araştırdık. Bunun için, insan karar vericilerin üretici (sözleşme 
öneren) ve perakendeci (sözleşmeyi kabul ederse sipariş miktarını belirleyen) rollerini 
oynadıkları uzun etkileşimli bilgisayarlı karar verme deneylerinden elde edilmiş verileri 
kullandık. Katılımcıları, anket cevaplarına göre, Rosenberg Ölçeği ile yüksek veya düşük 
özsaygı sahibi olarak sınıflandırdık. Düşük özsaygı kategorisindeki üreticilerin 
perakendecilere daha cazip kontratlar önerdiğini ve bunun da kendilerinin kârlarına kötü 
etki ederken tedarik zincirinin toplam kârını arttırdığını gözlemledik. Beklentilerimizin 
aksine, yüksek özsaygılı perakendecilerin düşük özsaygılı perakendecilere kıyasla daha 
düşük kârlı sözleşmeleri kabul ettiklerini gözledik. Bunu, yüksek özsaygılı 
perakendecilerin optimal gazeteci çocuk miktarına kıyasla daha fazla miktarda sipariş 
verme ve bunu daha sık yapma yatkınlıkları ile açıkladık. Üreticilerin, bir sözleşme 
reddini takip eden turda perakendecilere daha cazip bir sözleşme önerdiklerini gösterdik. 
Son olarak, perakendecilerin belirli bir turdaki sipariş miktarı kararlarını özsaygı puanı, 
bir önceki tur kaçırılan satış, o tura kadar reddedilmiş sözleşme sayısı ve optimal sipariş 
miktarı faktörlerini kullanarak açıklayacak regresyon modelleri geliştirdik. Çalışmamız, 
özsaygının tedarik zinciri kararlarını ve tarafların kâr performanslarını etkileyen önemli 
bir faktör olduğunu gösterdi.  
 
  
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor Dr. Murat Kaya for his 
invaluable support and guidance throughout this research. This research was based on 
data that was generated by a TÜBİTAK-funded project (TÜBİTAK Grant 111K454). 
 
 
 
  
vii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 10 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY ................................................................................... 13 
2.1. Supply Chain Experiments .......................................................................... 13 
2.2. Effects of Self-Esteem on Decisions ............................................................ 14 
3. ANALYTICAL MODEL .................................................................................... 16 
4. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE AND SELF-ESTEEM DATA ............................ 18 
4.1. Experiment Procedure ................................................................................. 18 
4.2. Self-Esteem Survey Data and Subject Classification .................................... 19 
4.3. Performance Measure: Profit Types ............................................................. 20 
5. ANALYSIS......................................................................................................... 22 
5.1. Effect of Self Esteem on Profits ................................................................... 22 
5.2. Retailer’s Underorder and Overorder Behavior ............................................ 26 
5.3. An Alternative Underorder-Overorder Categorization.................................. 29 
5.4. Contract Rejections ..................................................................................... 30 
5.5. Manufacturer Behavior After Rejections ...................................................... 33 
5.6. Explaining Retailers Order Decisions: A Regression Model ........................ 35 
6. EXTENSION: PAIRWISE SELF-ESTEEM COMPARISONS ........................... 42 
7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 46 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 48 
 
  
viii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 : Optimal order quantity for different contract categories ................................ 17 
Table 2 : Realized profit expressions for different contract categories and subject roles
 ................................................................................................................................... 17 
Table 3 : Classification of self-esteem (SE) and sample sizes ...................................... 20 
Table 4 : Sample sizes according to self-esteem class, data set and subject role ........... 21 
Table 5 : Manufacturer profit comparison (median values) in all contracts .................. 23 
Table 6 : Manufacturer profit comparison (median values) in accepted contracts ........ 24 
Table 7: Manufacturer total supply chain profit comparison (median values) in accepted 
contracts ..................................................................................................................... 24 
Table 8 : Retailer profit comparison (median values) in rejected contracts .................. 25 
Table 9 : Retailer profit comparison (median values) in accepted contracts ................. 26 
Table 10: Underorder and Overorder Quantities .......................................................... 26 
Table 11: Alternative Underorder-Overorder Categorization ....................................... 29 
Table 12: HSE and LSE Alternative Categorization .................................................... 29 
Table 13: Results of the basic regression analysis........................................................ 36 
Table 14: Correlation Matrix of the Variables ............................................................. 37 
Table 15: Results of the regression analysis with 0 values for excess inventory ........... 37 
Table 16: Results of the regression analysis with negative values for excess inventory 38 
Table 17: Results of the regression analysis with factor self-esteem ............................ 38 
Table 18 : Offered contract information and number of rejections by pairwise self-
esteem classes ............................................................................................................. 42 
Table 19 : Manufacturer profit comparison by pairwise self-esteem classes in accepted 
contracts ..................................................................................................................... 43 
Table 20 : Retailer profit comparison by joint self-esteem categories in rejected 
contracts ..................................................................................................................... 44 
Table 21: Pairwise Categorization of the Orders.......................................................... 44 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: HSE and LSE Retailer Underorder&Overorder Distributions ....................... 27 
Figure 2: Number of Rejected Contracts ..................................................................... 31 
Figure 3: HSE and LSE Average Period Rejections..................................................... 32 
Figure 4: Manufacturer %PRP Change After Rejection ............................................... 35 
Figure 5: Model Diagnostics ....................................................................................... 39 
Figure 6: Residuals vs Leverage .................................................................................. 40 
10 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Supply chains consist of multiple firms whose relations are governed by a supply contract. 
These firms often have conflicting incentives. This incentive misalignment can be 
addressed by properly designed supply contracts (Narayanan and Raman, 2004). Supply 
chain contracts enable risk-sharing between parties and can allow a system-wide 
performance enhancement (Höhn, 2010). Accordingly, supply chain contracting has 
become a popular topic of research in the last decades (Cachon, 2003).  
 
Supply chain contracting, by its nature, involves multiple decision makers. Modeling of 
supply chain decisions in the literature involves two sets of assumptions. First, there is 
the standard economic assumption that each party is a rational decision maker that aims 
to maximize expected utility. Second, it is often assumed that the interaction between the 
parties can be modeled using game theory (Hennet and Arda, 2007; Cai et al., 2008; Leng 
and Parlar, 2009; Zhao et al., 2010; Mazdeh and Karamouzian, 2014). These widely-used 
assumptions lead to nice theoretical results, and form the backbone of supply chain 
contracting research.  
 
The validity of these assumptions with real human decision makers, however, has 
increasingly been questioned by recent research. For instance, in their experiments, 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) state that subject order decisions systematically deviate 
from optimal order quantities that maximize expected profits. Again, Katok and Wu 
(2009) observe that participants often act boundedly rational, and may have different 
utility functions than mere profit maximization. Katok and Pavlov’s (2013) study shows 
fairness (inequity aversion) as an important behavioral factor in determining retailer 
response to offered contracts. Loch and Wu (2008) state that relationship preference 
increases cooperation and system efficiency while status seeking has a negative effect on 
those terms. Wu et al. (2013) studies effects of anxiety on social decision making. There 
is a wide literature on how to include risk-aversion into supply chain contracts (Agrawal 
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and Seshadri, 2000; Xu et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Zhu et al., 2017). Such works, which 
belong to the behavioral operations management (BOM) domain, have been 
complementing the traditional analytical studies by explaining the possible causes of 
deviations from theoretical predictions.  
 
In this thesis, we aim to understand the effects of an important behavioral factor, self-
esteem, on operational decisions in a supply chain setting. Self-esteem is a term that is 
related with personal beliefs about oneself once a person contemplates the self 
(Heatherton and Wyland, 2003). Possible influences of self-esteem such as relationship 
and job satisfaction, physical and mental health, and occupational status have been widely 
studied in psychology literature (Orth et al., 2012). Few studies consider the effect of self-
esteem on games between multiple decision makers. For instance, Paz et al. (2017) 
analyze the effects of self-esteem in a standard Ultimatum Game setting (Güth et al., 
1982). To the best of our knowledge, no study considers the effects of self-esteem in 
supply chain contracting relations.  
 
We use the data of an experimental study conducted by Akbay and Kaya (Reported in 
Akbay and Kaya, 2016). In these experiments, human subjects that play the roles of 
manufacturer and retailer for consecutive periods. The retailer faces the standard 
newsvendor problem. In each period, the manufacturer offers a contract, and the retailer 
either accepts the offer and determines her order (stock) quantity, or rejects the contract 
by ordering zero units. Both firms obtain zero profit in case of a contract rejection. We 
analyze the data to answer the following three research questions: First, how does self-
esteem affect the profits of the contracting parties in the supply chain? Second, what is 
the effect of self-esteem on underorder-overorder behavior of the retailers? Third, what 
is the effect of self-esteem on retailer’s contract rejections, and manufacturer’s post-
rejection behavior?  
 
In Section 2, we review the relevant literature on behavioral experiments and the concept 
of self-esteem. Section 3 introduces our analytical model. The experimental procedure 
and self-esteem survey data are explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents our data 
analysis and results, and introduces a regression model that explains order quantity 
decisions. In Section 6, we provide an extension study that is based on the pairwise self-
12 
 
esteem scores of the manufacturer and the retailer. In Section 7 we conclude and provide 
managerial discussions. 
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
Our work is related mainly with two research streams: Literature on supply chain 
experiments and literature on the effects of self-esteem on human decisions.  
 
2.1. Supply Chain Experiments 
Behavioral operations researchers explain the effects of human decision factors on 
operational decisions, often by conducting experiments with human decision makers 
(Katok, 2011). Laboratory experiments is the major method used in BOM research; 
followed by surveys and case studies (Schorsch et al., 2017). Experiments are highly 
efficient in terms of both time and cost (Siemsen, 2011). The findings of behavioral 
experiments can lead to improved OM models by providing new information on how 
behavioral factors can be integrated into theoretical models (Boudreau, et al., 2003). With 
experiments, researchers have the power to manipulate treatment variables which may 
not be manageable in a real work environment (Deck and Smith, 2013).  
 
Experimental approach is particularly useful for supply chain management research due 
to the existence of multiple human decision makers with conflicting incentives. 
Researchers have been using experiments to improve the understanding of behavioral 
factors in supply chain coordination (Croson and Donohue, 2002). Experiments can 
provide insights about long term relationships by enabling repeated interactions between 
parties (Wu, 2012). In our study, we make the subjects play a supply chain interaction 
game for consecutive periods with the same partner to observe their interaction in a long-
term relationship. 
 
Experiment data offers an advantage over survey data, since experiment data can indicate 
causality while survey data can only indicate correlation (Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011). 
In our study, we use both the subjects’ decision data from experiments and survey data 
on their personality traits.  
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2.2. Effects of Self-Esteem on Decisions 
Self-esteem has an influence on decisions by affecting cognitive, emotional and 
behavioral responses in varying circumstances (Rebellow and Patra, 2017). We discuss 
the effects of self-esteem on decisions in two categories; personal decisions which only 
affect the self, and strategic decisions which involve an interaction between multiple 
decision makers.  
 
In settings that involve only personal decisions, such as the Allais Paradox experiments 
(Allais, 1953), low self-esteem people are observed to choose the safer option more 
frequently than high self-esteem people do (Petit et al., 2011). Choices of high self-esteem 
people tend to have more self-efficacy and are more vigilant (Filippello et al., 2013). 
There are studies considering long term effects of self-esteem as well. For instance, 
Trzesniewski et al. (2006) suggests that adolescents with low self-esteem tend to have 
worse psychical and mental health, poorer economic prospects and show higher criminal 
behavior during their adulthood compared to the adolescents with high self-esteem. 
However, pursuit of self-esteem may be costly. For instance, Crocker and Park (2004) 
argue that having self-validation goals may cause people to react to threats in a way that 
weaken capacity of learning, autonomy and self-regulation, which may adversely affect 
personal decisions. 
 
In strategic decisions, the inherent uncertainty due to the other party’s decision causes 
extra risk. Josephs et al. (1992) suggests that low self-esteem people may avoid risky 
decisions more often, because losing may be costlier for them than it is for high self-
esteem people due to having less self-protective resources to face problems. Therefore, 
low self-esteem people try to act in a way which minimizes regret. Wray and Stone (2005) 
found a negative correlation between self-esteem and anxiety levels. They state that 
people with high self-esteem and low anxiety make more risky decisions for themselves 
than people with low self-esteem and high anxiety. People with high self-esteem are 
aware of their relational value and expect acceptance from a group (Anthony et al., 2006). 
Therefore, they make riskier decisions more easily compared to low self-esteem people. 
In our supply chain experiment context, this translates into high self-esteem retailers to 
overorder more than low self-esteem retailers. 
15 
 
 
Self-esteem is also known to be an important factor when one party has “veto power”, 
that is, the power to reject the offer of the other party, leading to an undesirable outcome 
for both parties. This corresponds to retailer’s contract rejection in our setting. Dunn et 
al. (2010) argue that individuals with high perceived self-worth believe that they are 
worth more than what is offered and therefore reject unfair offers. They further suggest 
that rejection behavior is a tool for self-esteem regulation and rejecting an unfair offer 
protects positive self-regard. Thus, in our experiments, we expect retailers with high self-
esteem to reject unfair offers more often compared to retailers with low self-esteem. 
Another dimension of self-esteem is about how people react to rejections. People with 
low self-esteem have the fear of rejection more and they have difficulty with facing 
problems (Murray et al., 2002). Thus, in our setting, we expect low self-esteem 
manufacturers to offer contracts that are less likely to be rejected by their retailers. 
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3. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
 
In the experiment, human decision makers play the roles of manufacturer (he) and retailer 
(she) that interact repeatedly for a number of periods, which simulates a long-run 
relationship. In each period, first the manufacturer offers a contract to the retailer by 
setting the contract parameters. Next, the retailer either rejects the contract, or accepts it 
and decides on the order quantity. The manufacturer then delivers the ordered quantity to 
the retailer prior to the sales season. Production cost at the manufacturer is $3 per unit 
and the unit sales price at the retailer, !, is $12. Consumer demand for the product at the 
retailer is probabilistic, having a discrete uniform distribution between 51 and 150.  
 
We refer to this interaction in each period as a “game” between the two parties. Note that 
the outcome in each game, such as the sales quantity and the two parties’ profits, depend 
on three factors: Manufacturer’s contract parameters decision, retailer’s quantity decision 
and the realization of the random demand. The theoretical solution of the interaction in 
each period is characterized by the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the respective multi-
stage game.  
 
The experimental data pools together the data obtained under three different contracts: 
wholesale price, buyback and revenue-sharing contracts. In the wholesale price contract 
("), the manufacturer only sets one parameter which is the wholesale price, ". In the 
buyback contract (", #), the manufacturer also sets the buyback price, #, which is the 
price at which the manufacturer buys back the unsold products from the retailer. In the 
revenue-sharing contract (", $), the manufacturer sets both " and the revenue-share, $, 
which denotes the manufacturer’s share of revenue for each product sold to consumers.  
Note that in this work, we do not study the differences in results under these three contract 
categories. We are interested in the effects of factors common to each contract type, such 
as under/overordering with respect to the optimal newsvendor quantity, and contract 
rejections.  
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For a given accepted contract offer of the manufacturer, theory predicts that the retailer 
will choose the newsvendor order quantity %∗ to maximize her expected profit. This 
quantity is expressed in Table 1 under the three contract categories.  
 
Table 1 : Optimal order quantity for different contract categories 
 
Wholesale Price Contract Buyback Contract Revenue Sharing Contract %∗(") = )"# *! − "! , %∗(", #) = )"# *! − "! − #, %∗(", $) = )"# *! − " − $! − $ , 
 
Using the newsvendor order quantity, one can calculate the expected sales of the retailer 
and the expected profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. We refer to these values as 
the “predicted values” as they assume the newsvendor-model-predicted order quantity. 
In the experiments, retailer subjects often choose some other quantity than the 
newsvendor-predicted one. We refer to the expected outcome under this chosen quantity 
as the “expected values”. In addition to the predicted and expected values, we also use 
the term “realized values” to refer to the observed sales and profit values, which depend 
on the demand realization. Table 2 provides the mathematical expressions for the realized 
profit based on different contract categories and subject roles.  
 
Table 2 : Realized profit expressions for different contract categories and subject roles 
Wholesale Price Contract 
Retailer −"%+ 12	234(%,5) 
Manufacturer (" − 3)% 
Buyback Contract 
Retailer −"%+ 12	234(%, 5) + #(% −234(%,5)) 
Manufacturer (" − 3)% − #(% −234(%,5)) 
Revenue Sharing Contract 
Retailer −"% + (12 − $)	234(%,5) 
Manufacturer (" − 3)% + $	234(%,5) 
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4. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE AND SELF-ESTEEM DATA 
 
This section explains the conduct of experiments, the self-esteem survey data and the 
associated subject classification, and the performance measures used in our analysis.  
 
4.1. Experiment Procedure 
The experiments were conducted at the CAFE (Center for Applied Finance Education) 
laboratory in Sabanci University campus. All 132 subjects were voluntary Sabanci 
University students. Subjects were provided with instruction sheets before coming to the 
lab. Upon their arrival to the lab, an experimenter went over the rules one more time and 
answered any questions that the subjects might have. Before the real experiment started, 
three pilot periods were conducted to ensure subjects’ knowledge of the game and the 
computer interface. The results of these pilot periods were not recorded. Subjects were 
incentivized with real monetary payment proportional to the total profit they obtained 
during the real experiment periods. 
 
Each subject was assigned the role of either retailer or manufacturer, and their roles were 
kept unchanged until the end of the experiment. All 66 retailer-manufacturer pairs (22 
from each contract category) played the game for 40 consecutive periods. In accordance 
with the theoretical model, in each period, first the manufacturer set the contract 
parameters. These were transmitted to the retailer’s screen by the server computer. Seeing 
the contract offer, the retailer decided on the order quantity which can be 0, which means 
rejection, or an integer quantity between 51-150. Finally, the demand was realized, and 
the profits were calculated. The outcome of each game was shared with both parties at 
the end of each period. The subjects had access to their historical results through a 
separate window on their screen. They were also provided with a decision support tool 
which allowed them to conduct what-if analysis before submitting their decisions.  
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4.2. Self-Esteem Survey Data and Subject Classification 
In addition to making decisions in the experiment, each subject also in a survey that 
measures the self-esteem class. The survey was based on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) which is popular among researchers (Baumeister et al., 2003). 
In this scale, the subject needs to answer the following 10 statements with one of the 
following responses; “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree”.  
 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.  
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.  
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.  
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.  
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.  
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.  
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.  
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.  
9. I certainly feel useless at times.  
10.  At times I think I am no good at all.  
 
For the positive statements (statements 1,2,4,6 and 7), “Strongly Agree” was scored as 3, 
“Agree” as 2, “Disagree” as 1 and “Strongly Disagree” as 0. For the negative statements 
(statements 3,5,8,9 and 10) the scoring is in the opposite direction, starting with “Strongly 
Agree” as 0, and ending with “Strongly Disagree” as 3.  Subjects are classified over their 
total score over the ten questions.  
 
To have sufficient separation between classes and sufficient number of data points under 
each class, we chose to label the subjects with the top 33% scores as “High Self-Esteem 
(HSE)” and the bottom 33% as “Low Self-Esteem (LSE)”. Accordingly, as summarized 
in Table 3, 44 subjects were classified as low self-esteem (score range 9-20) and 39 
subjects as high self-esteem (score range 26-30). Subjects that fall into neither LSE nor 
HSE classes were labeled as “Medium Self-Esteem” and their data was not used in testing 
our self-esteem-related hypotheses.  Note that some researchers that use the Rosenberg 
Scale may use different thresholds for low and high self-esteem. 
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Table 3 : Classification of self-esteem (SE) and sample sizes 
Class Self-Esteem  Score Range 
# of Manufacturers 
per category 
# of Retailers  
per category 
 Low self-esteem (LSE) 9-20 26 18 
High self-esteem (HSE) 26-30 19 20 
 
 
4.3. Performance Measure: Profit Types 
Here, we describe how we measure the profit types, which is the performance measure 
used in our analysis. We begin with the experimental data: Each row in our experimental 
data table corresponds to the results of one particular game (i.e., one period interaction) 
of a particular manufacturer-retailer pair. Columns indicate the manufacturer and retailer 
IDs, period number, contract category (wholesale, buyback or revenue-sharing), self-
esteem class (low, medium or high) of the manufacturer and retailer, contract parameters 
(", #, $) set by the manufacturer, order quantity (%) decision of the retailer, predicted 
order quantity (%*), demand realization and the realized profits of the retailer and the 
manufacturer.  
 
The unit of analysis is the average value in each manufacturer-retailer pair over relevant 
periods in the subject-level data and all relevant periods’ values separately in the pooled 
data. We pool the data of all contract types, leading to 66 manufacturer-retailer pairs. 
Originally, we had 2640 rows of data. Two rows, where the wholesale and buyback price 
both were set at 12 were eliminated because these values result in an error in %* 
calculation. One manufacturer-retailer pair that had 21 rejections out of 40 offers was 
considered as an outlier and all 40 rows of their data was excluded from the analysis. This 
left us with 65 manufacturer-retailer pairs and 2598 rows of data.  
 
We compare subjects’ performance based on profit at three types we define: predicted, 
expected and realized. Predicted profit is calculated based on the newsvendor-optimal 
order quantity (%*). Being independent of the retailer’s own quantity decision and 
demand realization, predicted retailer profit is a measure of contract attractiveness for the 
retailer. Expected retailer profit, on the other hand depends on the retailer’s own quantity 
decision, but is independent of the demand realization. Realized profit depends on the 
21 
 
demand realization, and hence, can be quite variable. This profit type is what the subjects 
observe at the end of each period in the experiment, and what their payment is based on.  
 
Rejected contracts result in zero profit for both parties. As such, one can arrive at different 
conclusions about a subject’s profit performance depending on whether rejected contract 
data is considered or not. We use the term “data set” to indicate if the data of all games 
(ALL), only those with accepted contracts (AC), or only those with rejected contracts 
(RC) are considered. ALL set allows an overall comparison about performance. AC set 
allows studying the dynamics of retailer’s order quantity decision. RC set is used for 
studying the factors affecting contract rejection or acceptance.  
 
ALL set has 65 rows, each representing the average results over 40 periods for each of 
the 65 manufacturer-retailer pairs. The AC set contains for each pair the average values 
of periods in which the contract was accepted. Because all pairs have at least one accepted 
contract over the 40 periods, all pairs are represented in the AC set, leading to 65 rows. 
The RC set contains the average values of periods in which the contract was rejected. In 
nine out of 65 manufacturer-retailer pairs, no contract was ever rejected. Thus, the RC set 
contains only 56 pairs’ data.  
 
The number of manufacturer and retailer subjects falling under each self-esteem and data 
set combination is given in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 : Sample sizes according to self-esteem class, data set and subject role 
Self-esteem Class Data Set # of Manufacturers # of Retailers 
LSE RC 24 15 
HSE RC 17 18 
LSE AC 26 18 
HSE AC 19 20 
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5. ANALYSIS 
 
We develop our hypotheses based on the effect of self-esteem on the profits of the 
manufacturer and retailer. We tested our hypotheses with the Wilcoxon test, using R 
software. We label hypothesis testing results with p<0.10 as significant. The results of 
some hypothesis tests are reported at all three profit types of predicted, expected and 
realized. For some hypotheses, we provide comparisons at both the individual subject-
level (for which we denote the p values as “s. p-values”), and the pooled level which 
contains the data of the all relevant games in all periods (for which we denote the p values 
as “p. p-values”).   
 
We first discuss the results of the effect of self-esteem on subject profits. Next, we analyze 
retailer’s underorder-overorder behavior in detail. Then, we extend this analysis with an 
alternative underorder-overorder categorization. We continue with retailer’s rejection 
behavior and finalize our analysis with manufacturer’s behavior after contract rejections. 
Finally, we present a regression model to explain the retailers’ order quantity decisions.  
 
 
5.1. Effect of Self Esteem on Profits 
First, we consider the data of all games (ALL). We expect low-self-esteem (LSE) 
manufacturers to offer contracts that have relatively higher retailer profit than the 
contracts that high-self-esteem (HSE) manufacturers offer. We propose two reasons to 
motivate this hypothesis. First, we believe LSE manufacturers to be more concerned 
about getting rejected. Second, we expect HSE manufacturers to trust in their ability to 
force the retailers to accept less attractive contracts.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Contract offers of LSE manufacturers will have higher retailer profit than 
the contract offers of HSE manufacturers. 
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The two firms do not engage in a zero-sum game. Yet, offering more profitable contracts 
to the retailer often requires the manufacturer to forego his own profits. Thus, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Contract offers of LSE manufacturers will have lower manufacturer profit 
than the contract offers of HSE manufacturers.  
 
Table 5 compares the median profit at each profit type and the p-values of the self-esteem 
comparison. We observe Hypothesis 1 to be supported at all three profit types at both the 
subject-level and pooled data, indicating that contracts offered by LSE manufacturers 
have higher retailer profits. Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, is supported only at the 
expected and realized profit types at the subject-level data and supported at all profit types 
at the pooled data. 
 
Table 5 : Manufacturer profit comparison (median values) in all contracts  
All Games 
Data 
(ALL) 
Predicted 
Retailer 
Profit 
Predicted 
Mfg. Profit 
Expected 
Retailer 
Profit 
Expected 
Mfg. Profit 
Realized 
Retailer 
Profit 
Realized 
Mfg. Profit 
LSE Mfg. 307 419 256 374 283.5 382 
HSE Mfg. 246 433 202 425 211 423 
s. p-values 0.022 0.107 0.012 0.068 0.004 0.082 
p. p-values 2.12e-21 1.084e-10 1.317e-19 6.902e-14 1.114e-10 3.662e-09 
 
Next, we constrain our attention to accepted contract offers only. We expect the contract 
offers of LSE manufacturers to be more attractive for retailers compared to those of the 
HSE manufacturers. Following the same logic with Hypothesis 2, we expect the profit of 
the LSE manufacturers to be lower than that of the HSE manufacturers. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Accepted contract offers of LSE manufacturers will have higher retailer 
profit than accepted contract offers of HSE manufacturers.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Accepted contract offers of LSE manufacturers will have lower 
manufacturer profit than accepted contract offers of HSE manufacturers. 
 
Table 6 presents the comparison for accepted contracts. Hypothesis 3 is supported as LSE 
manufacturers offer contracts with higher retailer profits than HSE manufacturers at all 
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profit types at both the subject-level and the pooled data. Meanwhile, LSE manufacturers 
have lower manufacturer profits and this result is significant for all profit types for both 
the subject-level and the pooled data. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
 
Table 6 : Manufacturer profit comparison (median values) in accepted contracts  
Accepted 
Contracts 
(AC) 
Predicted 
Retailer 
Profit 
Predicted 
Mfg. Profit 
Expected 
Retailer 
Profit 
Expected 
Mfg. 
Profit 
Realized 
Retailer Profit 
Realized 
Mfg. Profit 
LSE Mfg. 319 407.5 299.5 403 323.5 408.5 
HSE Mfg. 256 433 216 450 223 450 
s. p-values 0.013 0.068 0.007 0.034 0.002 0.062 
p. p-values 2.17e-24 1.40e-11 4.85e-27 3.50e-16 3.97e-14 2.66e-10 
 
So far, we have seen that contracts offered by LSE manufacturers end up having lower 
manufacturer profits and higher retailer profits compared to the contracts offered by HSE 
manufacturers. However, there is another dimension of the negotiation; the total supply 
chain profit. For this purpose, the following hypothesis suggests if accepted contracts 
offered by LSE manufacturers also have higher total supply chain profit compared to 
contracts offered by HSE manufacturers.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Accepted contract offers of LSE manufacturers will have higher total 
supply chain profit than accepted contract offers of HSE manufacturers. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the Hypothesis 5. It is supported at all three profit types at 
both the subject-level and pooled data. This shows that LSE manufacturers not only 
offering better contracts in terms of retailer profit but also overall supply chain profit.  
 
Table 7: Manufacturer total supply chain profit comparison (median values) in accepted 
contracts 
Accepted Contracts 
(AC) 
Total Predicted 
Profit 
Total Expected 
Profit 
Total Realized 
Profit 
Low_M 743 723 748 
High_M 712 713 721 
s. p-values 0.016 0.065 0.004 
p. p-values 5.06e-26 5.00e-06 7.77e-03 
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We now present results concerning the retailers’ contract rejection and acceptance 
behavior. We expect self-esteem to be positively correlated with self-confidence, and this 
to be effective in the retailer’s ability to push the manufacturer towards offering better 
contracts. Moreover, HSE retailers may think that they deserve a better contract than what 
is offered. These in turn would cause higher retailer profit in the rejected contracts of 
HSE retailers compared to those of LSE retailers.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Contracts rejected by HSE retailers will have higher predicted retailer 
profit than the contracts rejected by LSE retailers.  
 
Table 8 summarizes the results related to rejected contracts. Recall that by definition, 
rejected contract data has zero expected and realized profits for both parties. We observe 
the predicted profit difference between LSE and HSE retailers to be small and 
insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is not supported. 
 
Table 8 : Retailer profit comparison (median values) in rejected contracts  
Rejected Contracts 
(RC) 
Predicted 
Retailer Profit 
Expected 
Retailer Profit 
Realized 
Retailer Profit 
LSE Retailers 174 0 0 
HSE Retailers 185.5 0 0 
s. p-values 0.407 - - 
p. p-values 0.113 - - 
 
 
With accepted contracts, we expect HSE retailers to have higher profit than LSE retailers. 
This is because HSE retailers are more likely to punish manufacturers when faced with 
unattractive contracts. They should end up accepting higher profited contracts because of 
their ego and belief in self-worth.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Contracts accepted by HSE retailers will have higher retailer profit than 
contracts accepted by LSE retailers. 
 
Table 9 compares the contracts accepted by LSE and HSE retailers. Contrary to what we 
expected in Hypothesis 7, HSE retailers have lower profits than LSE retailers for the 
contracts they accepted. Thus, Hypothesis 7 is rejected. Having high self-esteem does not 
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seem to benefit retailers. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we aim to understand the underlying 
reasons for this phenomenon by looking into retailer’s underorder and overorder behavior 
in detail.  
 
Table 9 : Retailer profit comparison (median values) in accepted contracts  
Accepted 
Contracts (AC) 
Predicted 
Retailer Profit 
Expected 
Retailer Profit 
Realized 
Retailer Profit 
LSE Retailers 335 308 326 
HSE Retailers 274 249 268.5 
s. p-values 0.840 0.896 0.860 
p. p-values 1.000 1.000 0.999 
 
 
5.2. Retailer’s Underorder and Overorder Behavior 
Retailer’s deviations from the newsvendor-predicted order quantity (%*) is a major 
determinant of both firms’ profit values. In this section and in the following one, we 
analyze the relation between retailers’ self-esteem class, and their underorder and 
overorder tendencies in detail.  An underorder refers to an accepted contract with % < %*, 
whereas an overorder refers to a contract with % > %*.  Table 10 summarizes the number 
of underorder and overorder instances for all retailers (including HSE, LSE as well as the 
Medium class), HSE and LSE retailers.  
 
Table 10: Underorder and Overorder Quantities 
 ALL HSE LSE 
# of Underorders 976 274 324 
# of Overorders 1279 431 292 
# of Optimal Orders (%*) 383 21 34 
# of Total Orders 2638 726 650 
% of Underorder 37% 38% 50% 
% of Overorder 48% 59% 45% 
% of Optimal order 15% 3% 5% 
 
We observe HSE retailers to overorder more frequently than they underorder, while the 
opposite is true for LSE retailers. Also, the difference between underorder and overorder 
percentages is much larger for HSE than for LSE.  
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Next, we analyze the magnitudes of overorders (%-	%*) for each accepted contract. Note 
that this analysis also addresses underorder instances as negative values. We believe high 
self-esteem to be associated with higher risk taking, leading to higher overorders.  
 
Hypothesis 8: HSE retailers will make larger overorders (higher %-	%*) compared to 
LSE retailers for the accepted contracts. 
 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of this metric for the HSE and LSE retailers. We clearly 
see that HSE retailers place overorders more frequently than LSE retailers. 59% of the 
HSE retailers overorder while this number is 45% for the LSE retailers. We also observe 
that HSE retailers have higher overorders in magnitude more. Approximately 24% of the 
HSE retailers overorder more than 25 while only 8% of the LSE retailers overorder in 
that scale. Hypothesis 8 is supported for both the pooled data and the subject-level data 
(pooled; p: 3.317e-11, m1:10, m2:0, n1:726, n2:650, subject-level; p: 0.056, m1: -0.29, 
m2: -3.81, n1:20, n2:18). HSE retailers significantly order more in magnitude than LSE 
retailers.  
 
 
 
  
  
An alternative way to compare the overordering behavior is using the metric %/	%*. 
 
Hypothesis 9: HSE retailers will have higher %/	%* values than LSE retailers for the 
accepted contracts. 
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Hypothesis 9 is supported for both the pooled data and the subject-level data (pooled; p: 
4.976e-11, m1:1.10, m2:1.00, n1:726, n2:650, subject-level; p: 0.059, m1:1.01, m2:0.96, 
n1:20, n2:18). Thus, this metric also supports the finding that HSE retailers tend to make 
larger overorders.  
 
One potential explanation for why HSE retailers overorder more is that HSE retailers 
might be offered lower %* values in the first place, which leaves more room for 
overordering. We check this with the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 10: Accepted contract offers of HSE retailers will have lower %* values than 
the accepted contract offers of LSE retailers. 
Hypothesis 10 is not supported in neither pooled nor subject-level data (pooled; p-value: 
0.248, m1:93, m2:92, n1:726, n2:650, subject-level; p: 0.448, m1:97, m2:90, n1:20, 
n2:18). This shows that there is not a statistically significant difference in terms of the 
accepted contract %* values between HSE and LSE retailers.  
 
Finally, we compare the subject percentages of under and overorder between the two 
retailer types. Here, each data point is a retailer’s ratio of overorder or underorder in 
accepted contracts. For example, if a retailer accepted 35 of the 40 contracts and has 
overordered in 30 of them, then her overorder ratio will be 30/35. Therefore, here, we can 
only present subject-level p-values. We expect to see HSE retailers to have a higher 
overorder ratio and a lower underorder ratio compared to LSE retailers.   
 
Hypothesis 11: HSE retailers have higher percentage of overorders than LSE retailers 
in the accepted contracts. 
Hypothesis 12: HSE retailers will have lower percentage of underorders than LSE 
retailers in the accepted contracts. 
 
Both Hypothesis 11 (p: 0.051, m1: 0.65, m2: 0.44, n1:20, n2:18) and Hypothesis 12 (p: 
0.051, m1: 0.33, m2: 0.49, n1:20, n2:18) are supported. This provides further support that 
HSE retailers are inclined to overorder more, compared to LSE retailers.   
 
29 
 
 
5.3. An Alternative Underorder-Overorder Categorization 
Until now, we grouped all accepted contracts with %< %* as underorder and %> %* as 
overorder, where %* acts as a thin borderline between the two categories. Here, in Table 
11, we present a different categorization in which we define a “nearly optimal” zone 
around the %*. We also differentiate between “regular” and “critical” versions of under 
and overorders as outlined in Table 12. We prefer adding and extracting numbers rather 
than percentages when defining the range of the categories to be able to treat different %* 
values equally. Since taking percentage would give different ranges for different amounts 
of %*. 
 
Table 11: Alternative Underorder-Overorder Categorization 
Categorization %-%* 
Critically Underorder < -20 - 
Underorder < -10 ³ -20 
Nearly Optimal ³ -10 £ 10 
Overorder > 10 £ 20 
Critically Overorder > 20 - 
 
Table 12: HSE and LSE Alternative Categorization 
Total HSE Retailer 
Rows: 726 Ratios 
Total LSE Retailer 
Rows: 650 Ratios 
Critically Underorder 131 18% Critically Underorder 122 19% 
Underorder 75 10% Underorder 91 14% 
Nearly Optimal 171 24% Nearly Optimal 271 42% 
Overorder 133 18% Overorder 79 12% 
Critically Overorder 216 30% Critically Overorder 87 13% 
 
We observe the overall underorder percentage to be similar between HSE and LSE 
retailers. On the other hand, there is a stark difference in the overorder percentage: HSE 
retailers overorder in 48% of the cases, where 30% of this is of the “critical” type, whereas 
these numbers are only 25% and 13% respectively for LSE retailers. The difference is 
accounted for in the percentage of “nearly-optimal” orders which has a value of 24% for 
HSE and 42% for LSE retailers. Thus, LSE retailers seem to make more newsvendor-
type ordering decisions, whereas HSE retailers take excessive risk more frequently. This 
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can lead LSE retailers to end up with more expected and realized retailer profits and profit 
shares than HSE retailers at the end of the game. We test these with the following 
hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 13: LSE retailers will have more expected retailer profit in accepted 
contracts than HSE retailers. 
 
Hypothesis 14: LSE retailers will have more expected retailer profit share in accepted 
contracts than HSE retailers. 
 
Hypothesis 13 is only supported at the pooled data (pooled; p: 4.513e-11, m1:290, m2:241, 
n1:650, n2:726, subject-level; p: 0.110, m1: 308, m2:249, n1: 18, n2: 20) yet the 
difference between median values is high and p-value is almost significant at the subject-
level as well. Hypothesis 14 is supported (pooled; p: 3.947e-14, m1: 0.43, m2: 0.35, n1: 
650, n2:726, subject-level; p: 0.074, m1: 0.435, m2: 0.35, n1: 18, n2: 20). These results 
were based on the expected values. We have found parallel results with the realized profit 
values as well. From Hypothesis 10, we already know that there is not a difference in 
terms of %* values of the accepted contracts. Hence, the low expected and realized profit 
share values for the HSE retailers may be due to their orders being further away from the 
optimal order quantity compared to that of LSE retailers.   
 
To summarize, our analysis so far shows that HSE retailers overorder more than LSE 
retailers. LSE retailers’ order quantities closer to the optimal value, whereas HSE retailers 
suffer from an overordering bias. In the following subsection, we analyze the effect of 
self-esteem on contract rejection behavior. 
 
 
5.4. Contract Rejections 
A contract rejection causes both parties to receive zero profit in the period it occurred. 
Beyond that, a contract rejection can have further indirect effects. One is that, to make up 
for the lost profit, the retailer may be inclined to accept future contracts more frequently. 
Another is that the manufacturer can have a negative reaction to his contract being 
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rejected. We investigate these two effects respectively in this and the subsequent 
subsection.   
 
As stated in the literature review, high self-esteem is positively correlated with high ego 
and hence, we expect HSE retailers to reject more contracts than LSE retailers. In what 
follows, we present a number of analyses that compare the rejection behavior of HSE and 
LSE retailers.  
 
Hypothesis 15: HSE retailers will reject more of the contracts they are offered than LSE 
retailers. 
 
In this analysis, each retailer’s total number of rejections is a data point. Hypothesis 15 is 
not supported (subject-level: p: 0.535, m1: 3, m2: 3, n1: 20, n2:18). Figure 2 provides the 
distribution of HSE and LSE retailers according to the number of contracts they rejected, 
out of 40 offers.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Rejected Contracts 
 
Note that rejection is not the only way for the retailer to protest the manufacturer. The 
retailer can also signal dissatisfaction by ordering the minimum quantity, which is 50, or 
by critically underordering with respect to the newsvendor quantity. From Section 5.3, 
we already know that there is not much difference in critical underorders between HSE 
and LSE retailers. We also wanted to check if a difference arises when the three ways of 
protest (rejection, ordering the minimum order quantity and making a critical underorder) 
are counted together. The numbers indicate no difference, though: HSE retailers exhibit 
these behaviors in 26% of the time while for the LSE retailers, this number is 27%.   
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Another potential difference is in how the number of contract rejections change over time. 
In initial periods, rejection has a value in that it can lead to better profits in future periods. 
However, a rejection in the latter periods of the relationship does not offer such a value. 
Hence, we compare the number of rejections in the first and the second halves of the 
experiment. 
 
Figure 3 compares the average number of rejections per subject in each period. We 
observe the average number of rejections to decrease in the second half of the experiment 
in LSE retailers; whereas, there is no such reduction for HSE retailers (Paired Wilcoxon 
Test, subject-level p-values of 0.019 and 0.220 respectively). Given that contract rejection 
is a way to “protest” the other party, LSE retailers seem to settle down with what they 
have, whereas HSE retailers keep struggling for a longer period. 
 
 
Figure 3: HSE and LSE Average Period Rejections 
 
Next, we check the attractiveness of the contracts in the two halves of the experiment by 
comparing the predicted retailer profits (PRP) of contracts offered to each particular 
retailer in the two halves of the experiment, with a paired Wilcoxon Test. 
 
Hypothesis 16: For both HSE and LSE retailers, the predicted retailer profit (PRP) of 
the offered contracts will increase in the second half of the experiment compared to the 
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Hypothesis 16 is supported for both HSE and LSE retailers (subject-level p-values of 
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second half of the experiment. Therefore, an alternative explanation to the smaller number 
of rejections in the second half is the increase in the attractiveness of the offered contracts. 
LSE retailers respond to this profit increase in the contracts by reducing the number of 
rejections significantly. On the other hand, HSE retailers do so on average but not on a 
statistically significant level.  
 
In the following subsection, we study how these retailer rejections affect manufacturer 
behavior in the subsequent period.  
 
 
5.5. Manufacturer Behavior After Rejections 
Contract rejections can have an effect of the rest of the relationship between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. They may either deteriorate the relationship and cause the 
manufacturer to offer less attractive contracts, or they may work as a useful warning (or 
punishment) tool and cause the manufacturer to offer more attractive contracts.  
 
Here, we analyze if a rejection positively affects the predicted retailer profit (PRP) in the 
subsequent period. Recall that PRP is the retailer’s profit in case the retailer orders the 
newsvendor optimal order quantity (%*) for the offered contract. Since contract 
parameters are defined by the manufacturer, we compare the behavior of the manufacturer 
before and after a contract rejection.  
 
Hypothesis 17:  An HSE manufacturer will increase the PRP of his contract offer in the 
next period following a rejection.  
 
Hypothesis 18:  An LSE manufacturer will increase the PRP of his contract offer in the 
next period following a rejection.  
 
Both hypotheses are supported at both the pooled and subject-level data (Hypothesis 17; 
pooled, p: 1.583e-08, m:70, n:63, subject-level, p: 0.0004, m:80.33, n:17, Hypothesis 18; 
pooled, p: 1.019e-08, m:85, n:96, subject, p: 5.263e-05, m:77.64, n:24). Thus, both types 
of manufacturers respond to a contract rejection by offering a more attractive contract to 
the retailer.  
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Next, we compare the behavior of LSE and HSE manufacturers. For HSE manufacturers, 
after rejection, predicted retailer profit decreases in 11% of the contracts, does not change 
in 14% and increases in 75%. For LSE manufacturers; the respective figures are 13%, 
17% and 70%. Next, we compare the magnitude of these changes.  
 
Hypothesis 19:  LSE manufacturers will have higher PRP increase in their contract after 
rejection than HSE manufacturers.  
 
Hypothesis 19 is not supported (pooled; p: 0.206, m1: 85, m2:70, n1:96, n2:63, subject-
level; p: 0.401, m1:77.64, m2:80.33, n1:24, n2:17). On average, LSE has a change of 
78.30 while HSE has a change of 69.24 for the pooled data and LSE has a change of 86.76 
and HSE has a change of 83.77 for the subject-level data. So, this hypothesis is only 
supported in terms of average values. 
 
When we look at the PRP change after rejection period, we ignore the effect of the 
rejection period’s PRP. For example, if the PRP of the rejection period is relatively low, 
a higher PRP increase still means a low PRP. In that sense, we further analyze percentage 
changes between rejection and after rejection periods given in the below histograms for 
HSE and LSE manufacturers. According to Figure 4, we observe LSE manufacturers to 
offer higher percentage PRP change after rejection compared to HSE manufacturers (For 
instance, the share of more than 50% PRP increase for LSE is 38% and for HSE, it is 
26%).  
 
Hypothesis 20: HSE manufacturers will have lower percentage PRP increase after 
rejections than LSE manufacturers. 
 
Hypothesis 20 is not supported (pooled; p: 0.553, m1: 32%, m2:37%, n1: 57, n2:93). 
There is no significant difference between HSE and LSE manufacturers in terms of PRP 
percentage change after rejection. 
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Figure 4: Manufacturer %PRP Change After Rejection 
 
To summarize, even not statistically significant, LSE manufacturers have a higher PRP 
increase after rejection than HSE manufacturers on average. To make a better 
comparison, we need to know if the rejected contracts differ between LSE and HSE 
manufacturers. We expect LSE manufacturers to offer lower PRP in rejected contracts 
and that’s why they might be offering a higher increase afterwards.  
 
Hypothesis 21: LSE manufacturers will offer lower PRPs in rejected contracts than HSE 
manufacturers.  
 
Hypothesis 21 is not supported (pooled; p:0.546, m1:189, m2:200, n1:97, n2:63, subject-
level, p:0.630, m1:189, m2:189, n1:24, n2:17). In fact, LSE manufacturers offers of 
rejected contracts have a higher PRP on average (pooled; 191.09 for LSE and 182.03 for 
HSE and subject-level; 187.42 for LSE and 171.06 for HSE). Therefore, on average, LSE 
manufacturers increase PRP more after rejection even though they offer better contracts 
in the period of rejection.  
 
 
5.6. Explaining Retailers Order Decisions: A Regression Model 
Here, we present a number of multivariate linear regression models to explain the effect 
of self-esteem (SE) and a number of other variables on retailers’ order quantity (%) 
decisions. Accordingly, we use the data of the periods in which the retailer accepted the 
contract offer; that is, our accepted contract data, AC.  
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If decision makers were fully rational, we would expect the retailers to order the optimal 
order quantity. We know by now that this is not the case. Yet, we expect a positive 
correlation between % and %* as %* is a proxy of the attractiveness of the contract offer 
for the retailer. It is logical for the retailer to order higher quantities if the contract offer 
is profitable for her. To see how %* alone can explain %, we estimate the following basic 
linear regression model, %$% =	b& + 7#	%$%∗ +	8% 
 
Table 13: Results of the basic regression analysis 
Variables Estimate Standard Error t Value p-value 
b& 31.550 2.835 11.13  <2e-16 %$%∗  0.692 0.029 23.51 <2e-16 
 
Table 13 presents the results of the model. As expected, %* is positively correlated with % and its effect is significant. The model, however, has an adjusted R2 of only 0.190, 
which shows how insufficient %* alone is in explaining the retailer’s order quantity 
decisions in experiments.  
 
Next, we expand the model with some additional independent variables. Because we 
observed HSE retailers to overorder more than LSE retailers, we expect the self-esteem 
score of the retailer (9:) to be positively correlated with %. Another factor we consider 
is the contract rejection history. Previous rejections can increase % as the retailer can 
think that she has already punished the manufacturer and now, it is time for her to make 
a profit. Alternatively, previous rejections can poison the long-run relationship between 
the firms, causing a reduction in %. Finally, we consider the effect of unmet demand (;5) 
from the previous period, which occurs when demand is higher than the stock quantity. 
We conjecture that unmet demand in the previous period will positively affect the order 
quantity. We analyze unmet demand data in two different ways depending on how excess 
inventory (if any) is treated; as negative ;5	values versus as 0.   
 
The order quantity of retailer 3 in period < is modeled as,  
 %$% =	b& + 7#	9:$ +	7(%$%∗ +	7)=>$% + 7*;5$%"# +	8% 
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where  b&	is the intercept, 9:$ 	refers to retailer 3's self-esteem score, %$%∗  is the predicted 
newsvendor order quantity in period <, =>$% is the total number of rejections that the 
retailer made prior to period <, ;5$%"# is the unmet demand in period < − 1, and 8% is the 
error term.  
 
We checked against potential correlation between the predictor variables using Kendall’s 
method as we do not assume normality. As observed from the correlation values that are 
reported in Table 14, the highest correlation is found to be between =>$% and %$%∗  , and its 
value is only 0.110. The Spearman method also yielded similar results.  
 
Table 14: Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
Variables 9:$ %$%∗  =>$%  ;5$%"# 9:$ 1 -0.008 -0.064 -0.019 %$%∗  -0.008 1 0.110 -0.062 =>$%  -0.064 0.110 1 0.027 ;5$%"# -0.019 -0.062 0.027 1 
 
The results of this analysis with excess inventory being zero are provided in Table 15. 
The model has an adjusted R2 of 0.214.  
 
Table 15: Results of the regression analysis with 0 values for excess inventory 
Variables Estimate Standard Error t Value p-value 
b& 21.986 4.090 5.376 8.36e-08 9:$ 0.499 0.115 4.353 1.40e-05 %$%∗  0.704 0.030 23.758 <2e-16 =>$%  -0.348 0.201 -1.729 0.084 ;5$%"# -0.094 0.014 -6.848 9.52e-12 
 
All of the explanatory variables are significant. As we expected, the order quantity %$% is 
increasing in the self-esteem score of the retailer, 9:$ ,  increasing in the predicted 
newsvendor quantity of the contract, %$%∗ ,  and decreasing in the number of rejected 
contracts in the relationship up to that period, =>$%. Contrary to our expectation, unmet 
demand in the previous period, ;5$%"#	is found to have a negative effect on the order 
quantity. This can potentially be explained by the Gambler’s Fallacy behavior of the 
subjects, that is, they may erroneously be expecting a high demand realization (causing a 
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high unmet demand) to be followed by a low demand realization (causing a low order 
quantity decision). 
 
Then, we analyze the same model with excess inventory cases represented as negative 
unmet demand. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 16. Variables ;5$%"# 
and 	=>$% have more significance compared to previous model that represents excess 
inventory cases as “zero” unmet demand. We observe the adjusted R2 of the model to 
increase slightly to 0.225.  
 
Table 16: Results of the regression analysis with negative values for excess inventory 
Variables Estimate Standard Error t Value p-value 
b& 23.408 4.067 5.756 9.75e-09 9:$ 0.480 0.114 4.214 2.60e-05 %$%∗  0.681 0.030 22.974 < 2e-16 =>$%  -0.530 0.199 -2.660 0.008 ;5$%"# -0.108 0.012 -8.872 < 2e-16 
 
In the final linear regression model, we treat self-esteem (9:) values as a factor 
(categorical) variable rather than a numeric variable. This data only includes LSE and 
HSE retailers while the numeric 9: data also had medium self-esteem retailers. Excess 
inventory cases are treated as zero unmet demand. The adjusted R2 value is found to be 
0.219. As shown in Table 17, having low self-esteem (LSE variable) is found to have a 
negative impact on the order quantity, which is consistent with our earlier findings. 
Different from the other models, previous period’s number of rejections becomes 
insignificant in this model.  
 
Table 17: Results of the regression analysis with factor self-esteem 
Variables Estimate Standard Error t Value p-value 
b& 41.342 3.622 11.413 < 2e-16 ?9:$ -6.255 1.241 -5.039 5.31e-07 %$%∗  0.653 0.037 17.512 < 2e-16 =>$%  -0.260 0.250 -1.039 0.299 ;5$%"# -0.117 0.018 -6.487 1.22e-10 
 
In summary, self-esteem score of the retailer, the contract’s optimal order quantity, 
previous periods’ total number of rejections and previous period’s lost demand all have 
39 
 
significant effects in retailer’s order quantity choice. Models have modest adjusted R2 
values; yet, when we consider other possible biases and factors that affect retailers, this 
result is not surprising.  
 
We also checked what happens if %$%∗  is excluded from the model. In that case, in the 
model where excess inventory cases are represented as negative unmet demand, R2 
reduces to 0.051. Thus, %$%∗  is seen to have an important explanatory role in the model.  
 
Next, we outline regression diagnostics results. Since it has the highest adjusted R2, we 
again use the model where excess inventory cases are represented as negative unmet 
demand as an example. Figure 5 summarizes the results. 
 
 
Figure 5: Model Diagnostics 
 
Residuals vs Fitted plot shows that linearity assumption holds as the red line is almost 
horizontal; the relationship between stock given by the retailer and the model’s predictors 
(self-esteem score of the retailer, previous periods’ total number of rejections, previous 
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period’s unmet demand and the optimal order quantity of the contract offered) is indeed 
linear.  
 
From the Q-Q plot, we observe the residuals to mostly lie on the straight dashed line. 
Hence, the normality assumption also holds. Homoscedasticity is checked with the Scale-
Location plot. The line is horizontal, and points are nearly equally spread which supports 
the homogeneity of the variance. Yet, a non-constant variance test in R yields a p-value 
lower than our significance level, which indicates some heteroscedasticity in data. To 
eliminate this, as a further study, a variable transformation such as Box-Cox can be 
applied to the order quantity values.  
 
Influential value analysis is shown in the Cook’s distance plot. Three data points are 
chosen as top extreme points. These correspond to the games with low order quantity and 
high optimal order quantities, which cause a high Cook’s distance value. To check if these 
points have leverage on the regression analysis, we plot the Residuals vs Leverage graph 
in Figure 6. R software automatically alerts the user if there are points outside of the 
Cook’s distance by adding zones of red dashed lines to the plot. Since the Residuals vs 
Leverage plot doesn’t have such zones, we can say that all points are inside of the Cook’s 
distance lines and our data don’t have influential points.  
 
   
Figure 6: Residuals vs Leverage 
 
From Table 14, we already know that the correlation coefficients of the predictors are 
low. Yet, we check the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the predictors in our model and 
we find values around 1. This result eliminates the risk of multicollinearity.  
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Finally, the residuals in the model should be independent of each other. To check this, we 
apply a Durbin Watson test and find a test statistic of 1.64. As a rule of thumb, values 
less than 1 or more than 3 are considered problematic (Field, 2009). Hence, we can 
assume that our model has independent residuals.   
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6. EXTENSION: PAIRWISE SELF-ESTEEM COMPARISONS 
 
The hypotheses discussed far are concerned with the self-esteem class of one party only, 
the manufacturer or the retailer. Next, we consider the pairwise self-esteem class of the 
manufacturer-retailer pair. We use a four-letter acronym where the first letter (L or H) 
denotes the self-esteem class of the manufacturer and the second letter denotes that of the 
retailer, followed by “SE” for “self-esteem”. For instance, HLSE corresponds to pairs 
with a high-self-esteem manufacturer and a low-self-esteem retailer.   
 
Table 18 summarizes the number of pairs and total number of rejections for all four 
pairwise classes in the ALL data category.  
 
Table 18 : Offered contract information and number of rejections by pairwise self-esteem 
classes  
Pairwise Self-
Esteem Class 
 # of 
Pairs # of Rejections 
HHSE 6 18 
LLSE 7 24 
HLSE 4 16 
LHSE 10 37 
 
We observe HSE retailers to reject more contracts on average than LSE retailers when 
the manufacturer has low self-esteem. We expect HSE manufacturers to offer less 
favorable contracts than LSE manufacturers when self-esteem category of the retailer is 
fixed at H or L based on the previous hypotheses we tested. Comparisons are based on 
predicted retailer profit as this profit type directly indicates the attractiveness of a contract 
for the retailer.  
 
We expect higher manufacturer profit in accepted contracts when the manufacturer has 
high self-esteem. Thus,   
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Hypothesis 22: Accepted contract offers in HHSE will have higher manufacturer profit 
than accepted contract offers in LHSE. 
 
Hypothesis 23: Accepted contract offers in HLSE will have higher manufacturer profit 
than accepted contract offers in LLSE. 
 
Table 19 summarizes the comparisons on manufacturer’s profit with the pairwise self-
esteem classes. We observe Hypothesis 22 to be supported at the predicted profit for both 
the subject-level and the pooled data while at the expected and realized profits for only 
the pooled data. Hypothesis 23, on the other hand, is supported at the expected profit for 
both the subject-level and the pooled data while at the predicted and realized profits for 
only the pooled data.  
 
Table 19 : Manufacturer profit comparison by pairwise self-esteem classes in accepted contracts  
Accepted 
Contracts (AC) 
Predicted  
Mfg. Profit 
Expected  
Mfg. Profit 
Realized  
Mfg. Profit 
HHSE 488 443 442 
LHSE 402 411.5 424 
s. p-values 0.022 0.110 0.157 
p. p-values 5.50e-21 7.33e-11 1.09e-07 
HLSE 427.5 449 450 
LLSE 397 402 403 
s. p-values 0.115 0.082 0.158 
p. p-values 5.39e-08 8.48e-14 2.55e-09 
 
With the same logic in Hypothesis 6, we expect high self-esteem retailers to reject more 
attractive contracts. Thus,  
 
Hypothesis 24: Rejected contract offers in LHSE will have higher predicted retailer profit 
than rejected contract offers in LLSE. 
 
Hypothesis 25: Rejected contract offers in HHSE will have higher predicted retailer 
profit than rejected contract offers in HLSE. 
 
Table 20 presents the comparison results about the attractiveness of the rejected contracts 
for the retailer. We observe neither Hypothesis 24 nor Hypothesis 25 to be supported.  
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Table 20 : Retailer profit comparison by joint self-esteem categories in rejected contracts  
Rejected 
Contracts (RC) 
Predicted  
Retailer Profit 
Expected  
Retailer Profit 
Realized 
Retailer Profit 
LLSE 174 0 0 
LHSE 182 0 0 
s. p-values 0.396 - - 
p. p-values 0.544 - - 
HHSE 233 0 0 
HLSE 242 0 0 
s. p-values 0.793 - - 
p. p-values 0.648 - - 
 
Next, similar to the analysis in Section 5.3, we check the underordering & overordering 
tendency of the retailer with her manufacturer pair in Table 21. Remember that in this 
analysis, we ignore the data of pairs that have a medium self-esteem retailer or 
manufacturer. We observe low self-esteem retailers to place more nearly optimal orders 
independent of the manufacturer’s self-esteem class. Yet, this percentage is higher when 
the manufacturer has low self-esteem. Moreover, high self-esteem retailers make more 
decisions in the critical category compared to low self-esteem retailers.  
 
Table 21: Pairwise Categorization of the Orders 
 LLSE LHSE HLSE HHSE 
Critically Underorder 16% 18% 9% 19% 
Underorder 12% 10% 18% 11% 
Nearly Optimal 46% 23% 37% 24% 
Overorder 13% 17% 11% 18% 
Critically Overorder 13% 32% 25% 28% 
 
In summary, for the accepted contracts, we find partial support that HSE manufacturer 
has higher manufacturer profit than LSE manufacturer when the retailer’s self-esteem is 
fixed at H or L. Results are significant at the pooled data and almost significant in the 
subject-level data. This supports our previous findings that self-esteem is beneficial for 
manufacturers. However, for the rejected contracts we couldn’t find support for the 
hypotheses. We believe this may be due to small sample sizes as rejections occur less 
than acceptances and pairing subjects further decreases the sample size. Similar to our 
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previous analyses, we find LSE retailers to make more nearly optimal type decisions 
compared to the HSE retailers.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
In this research, we study if and how the self-esteem of retailers and manufacturers affect 
their decisions and the resulting profits in a supply chain scenario where the retailer is 
faced with a newsvendor decision. We find manufacturers with high self-esteem to offer 
less attractive contracts to retailers and to enjoy higher profits, while this is detrimental 
to the retailer’s and the total supply chain’s profits. Thus, having high self-esteem seems 
to be beneficial for the manufacturer’s own profit but detrimental to the other party.  
 
The retailer’s self-esteem, on the other hand may not turn out to be beneficial to her own 
performance. The average predicted profit of the contracts that high self-esteem retailers 
accept turned out to be lower than of those accepted by low self-esteemed retailers. To 
understand this unexpected result, we applied further analysis to observe under-
overorder, rejection and after rejection behaviors in detail. It turns out that, HSE retailers 
overorder more in both percentage and magnitude than LSE retailers. Even though they 
are offered similar contracts in terms of the predicted newsvendor quantity, HSE retailers 
act more risk-taking than LSE retailers by ordering more. This might be one of the reasons 
why HSE retailers on average (albeit not at a statistically significant level) earn lower 
profits than LSE retailers. On the other hand, the expected profit share of HSE retailers 
is significantly less than that of the LSE retailers. This observation suggests studying 
“fairness” as a factor explaining subject decisions in an extension study.  
 
We expected HSE retailers to reject more contracts than LSE retailers and in turn, cause 
a negative reaction in manufacturers leading to less attractive contract offers. However, 
we did not observe a significant difference between the number of rejected contracts 
between HSE and LSE retailers. On the other hand, we observe the average number of 
rejections to decrease in the second half of the experiment in LSE retailers, whereas there 
is no significant difference in HSE retailers. Hence, high self-esteem might cause the 
retailers to keep struggling with the manufacturers. We observe both LSE and HSE 
manufacturer types to offer more attractive contracts to retailers following rejections, as 
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measured by the predicted retailer profit. Thus, rejections seem to be useful in punishing 
the manufacturer and they work in retailer’s advantage. On average, low self-esteem 
retailers exhibit this behavior more; however, the difference is not significant.  
 
We applied a multivariate linear regression model to predict retailer’s order quantity 
decision. It turns out that order quantity is positively correlated with self-esteem score 
and optimal order quantity of the contract. Whereas, it is negatively correlated with 
previous periods’ total number of rejections and previous period’s unmet demand.   
 
We also study the effects of joint self-esteem categorization of the manufacturer-retailer 
pairs. In that study, although we have some directional observations, we could not arrive 
at significant results, especially for the subject-level data. This can be explained by the 
reduced number of data points due to pairwise categorization.   
 
This study presents the very first results concerning the effect of an important behavioral 
factor, self-esteem, in supply chain relations. Our results have important managerial 
implications for contract and incentive design in firms. We have reported a number of 
interesting and significant results, yet, we believe more can be shown with increased 
number of experiments.  
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